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Abstract 
We investigate the effect of priming on pro-social behaviour in a setting where there is a clear 
financial incentive to free ride. By activating the concept of cooperation among randomly 
selected individuals, we explore whether it is possible to positively influence people’s voluntary 
contributions to the public good. Our findings indicate that cooperative priming increases 
contributions in a one-shot public goods game from approximately 25% to 36% compared with 
the non-primed group. The results call for further explorations of the role of priming in economic 
behaviours in general.  
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1. Introduction 
In psychology, priming is an important instrument that has often been used in a laboratory setting 
to bring about changes in human behaviour (Kahneman, 2011; Dolan et al., 2012). It is formally 
defined as “the procedural feature that some previously activated information impacts on the 
processing of subsequent information” (Hertel and Fiedler, 1998). Although psychological 
research has demonstrated that priming generally leads to a change in individuals’ psychological 
processes (Bargh, 2006), there are some gaps in the literature with respect to incentive-
compatible behaviours. Although we know from studies in psychology that people’s attitudes 
and behaviours can be altered via priming, so far little is understood about whether priming a 
concept of cooperation can effectively alter an individual’s decisions when economic payoffs 
from certain behaviours are involved. We aim to contribute to the literature by answering the 
following question: does priming a concept of cooperativeness make people more pro-social in 
an environment where personal and collective interests are at odds and where there are clear 
financial incentives to free ride? 
Priming can take a variety of forms. For example, individuals can be primed through 
perceptual/attention priming, motor/action priming, or semantic priming (LaBerge and 
Buchsbaum, 1990; Strack and Deutsch, 2004). The most popular method of priming is perhaps 
semantic priming, i.e. word primes. For example, interesting research on semantic priming has 
found that individuals can be influenced to walk more slowly and to have a poorer memory of a 
room if they are exposed to words relating to the elderly (e.g. “wrinkles”) at the start of the 
experiment (Dijksterhuis and Bargh, 2001). In their meta-analysis, Bargh and Ferguson (2000) 
show that social behaviour can be carried out without the interaction of conscious acts of will 
and guidance and that priming will influence this unconscious behaviour (see also Bargh, 1989, 
for a review).  
Priming is not the same as framing or anchoring. The concept of framing refers to the re-
description of a logically equivalent decision problem in a positive or negative light (see, e.g., 
Ross and Ward, 1996; Liberman et al., 2004) and to how descriptive valence influences 
information processing,1 whereas, anchoring (see, e.g., Ariely et al., 2003) involves eliciting 
participants to focus on one trait or piece of information when making decisions. Priming, on the 
other hand, involves exposing a subject’s mind to a stimulus, concept, or memory – without 
                                                          
1 For a conceptual discussion and classification of framing effects, see Levin et al., 1998. 
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requiring the re-description of the decision problem – so that his or her pathways to that 
particular stimulus, concept, or memory are reinforced and would also later be reflected on the 
processing of subsequent information (Kolb and Wishaw, 2009).  
Whereas the issue of priming has been extensively explored over the last three decades in 
psychology, evidence on priming in economics remains scarce. If there is an experimental 
technique that can affect many types of behaviours, then economists should be using it, or at 
least exploring it. If priming affects people’s decisions independently of information and 
financial incentives, then standard economic models appear to be missing an important aspect of 
human behaviour. It also appears to be important for economists and social scientists to know 
whether priming may have a significant impact on cooperative behaviours in situations where the 
individual’s dominant strategy is to free ride. The frequent occurrence of social dilemmas in 
economic and social life makes them important for empirical investigation, in particular because 
experimental behaviour in this simple game has inspired the development of models of other-
regarding preferences. 
Thus far, a few notable studies have examined how priming on religious identities, 
optimistic social outlook, and social identity affects economic outcomes, including risk 
preferences, behaviour in trust and gift exchange games and dictator giving (Benjamin et al., 
2010a, 2010b; McKay et al., 2010; Atlas and Putterman, 2011; Cappelen et al., 2011). In our 
paper, we focus on cooperative priming in a standard linear public goods game in which 
randomly selected participants make decisions in situations where personal and group interests 
are misaligned. Much of the research on public goods experiments tends to focus on uncovering 
explicit mechanisms that foster cooperation, which include the introduction of sanctions and 
reward systems (e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002; Sefton et al., 2007; Sutter et al., 2010), the 
establishment of a leader (e.g. Güth et al., 2007; Levati et al., 2007), and the option for 
individuals to communicate prior to playing the game (e.g. Isaac and Walker, 1988; Bochet et al., 
2006). Such explicit mechanisms have been found to increase significantly the provision of 
public goods and to help to reduce the extent to which people free ride (see Gächter and 
Hermann, 2009; Chaudhuri, 2011, for recent reviews). 
By contrast, we explore the effect of a significantly more subtle intervention on the 
incentive to free ride in social dilemmas. We test whether activating the concept of 
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cooperativeness through priming leads to people behaving significantly more pro-socially. 2 Our 
main hypothesis is that cooperative priming will enable individuals to raise their voluntary 
contributions towards their common resources. Our findings indicate that priming a concept of 
cooperation reduces free riding and leads to an 11-percentage-point increase (from 
approximately 25% to 36%) in public good giving compared with a non-primed group. These 
results were obtained when real money was at stake for the participants. Together, these findings 
demonstrate that subtle priming cues may have a significant impact on cooperative behaviour 
and that research should be directed towards better understanding whether other modes of 
priming may change cooperative behaviours both in the laboratory and in the field. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the design and 
the hypotheses of our experiment. Our experimental findings are presented in Section 3. Section 
4 concludes. 
 
2. Experimental design and hypotheses 
2.1 Experimental design 
Our framework is the linear public goods game (Ledyard, 1995), which is a stylized 
model used to experimentally study cooperation issues. The structure of our linear public goods 
game is as follows. A group of three randomly selected participants was formed, and each 
participant within a group was given a fixed endowment of 20 tokens. Participants were 
simultaneously required to decide how many tokens to contribute to the public good (i.e. 𝐶𝑖). The 
payoff for participant i  is given as follows: 
𝜋𝑖 = 20 − 𝐶𝑖 + 0.5 ∙ ∑ 𝐶𝑗3𝑗=1  (1)  
Because the cost for the contributing subject was 1 money unit per token and the private return 
was only 0.5 money units, a selfish participant had an economic incentive to contribute nothing 
to the public good while also relying on the contributions of other participants. However, socially 
efficient outcomes can be achieved when, for example, all participants fully contribute their 
endowment to the public good (in this case each participant would receive an income equal to 30 
money units, which would be greater than his or her initial endowment). 
                                                          
2 It is important to note that our priming intervention can be criticized as being potentially an experimenter demand 
effect (Zizzo, 2010). To control for this possibility, in a post-experimental questionnaire we asked subjects to 
indicate whether they think their decisions in our experiment were affected by our priming task. We discuss how we 
controlled econometrically for such an effect in Section 3.  
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Our experimental design consisted of two treatments: one in which people were neutrally 
primed (NP-treatment) and another in which they were cooperatively primed (P-treatment). The 
priming manipulation was carried out through an initial word-search puzzle that each participant 
self-completed at the beginning of each experimental session (e.g. Bargh et al., 2001). A 16×16 
matrix of letters was presented to the participants, each matrix containing a list of 20 words 
embedded within it. Each list contained the same set of 5 neutral words to be found (carpet, 
lamp, plant, shampoo, window), and the remaining 15 words being either associated with the 
concept of cooperation or completely neutral, depending on the treatment. In the P-treatment, 
these words were teamwork, assist, responsibility, participate, community, collaborate, mutual, 
united, share, collective, society, trust, harmony, contribute, and support. In the NP-treatment, 
these words were butterfly, turtle, umbrella, salad, corkscrew, illustrate, hat, building, gasoline, 
river, ranch, mountain, cabbage, stapler, and peach. Selection of the positive priming words was 
based on a pre-test in which 50 words were judged regarding their relatedness to cooperation. 
We recruited 28 pre-test participants to judge these 50 words, and ratings were made on a 7-point 
scale (1 = “not at all”, …, 7 = “very much”). Pre-test participants received a fixed payment of £5 
for completing this task. The selected primes were those with the highest ratings. Appendix A 
provides the complete list of the 50 words used, along with their corresponding average scores.3 
At the beginning of a session, participants were given 10 minutes to find as many words 
as they were able to, although their total earnings were not affected by their performance in this 
task. At the end of the allotted time, the participants received the solutions to the word-search 
puzzle to ensure that everyone in the treatment group had been primed with words associated 
with cooperation. After the participants had completed the first task, they were given new 
instructions describing the public goods game and tested on how payoffs were to be calculated, 
to enable us to make sure that they completely understood the game.  
The description of the second task was identical under both treatments (see online 
Appendix C for a copy of the instructions). Participants were required to decide how many 
tokens of their initial endowment they were willing to contribute. After they made their 
                                                          
3 We include the 16×16 matrix of the actual word search puzzle used in the experiment in online Appendix B. 
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contribution decisions, they were also asked to state their beliefs about the contributions of the 
other group members.4 
One notable aspect of our experimental design is that participants played a one-shot 
linear public goods game. The reason for choosing a one-shot interaction over repeated 
interactions is that we wanted to investigate the pure effects of our priming process on subjects’ 
cooperative behaviour, without these being confounded with strategic considerations that may 
arise from repeated interaction. Because the effect of priming on cooperative behaviour has not 
been extensively explored in economics, we are mainly interested in identifying whether such an 
effect exists, and if so, whether the effect is sizeable. The persistence of such an effect, if there is 
any, with the repetition of the game is beyond the scope of our experiment, but nonetheless 
would warrant further research. 
Participants were recruited at the University of York by means of the software ORSEE 
(Greiner, 2004). The experiment was conducted in the Centre for Experimental Economics 
(EXEC) laboratory at the University of York, and both treatments were computerized and 
programmed with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). At the end of each session, 
participants were privately paid according to their total amount of money units from the one-shot 
linear public goods game, using an exchange rate of £0.40 per money unit. Average earnings per 
treatment were as follows: £9 for the NP-treatment and £9.43 for the P-treatment. Sessions lasted 
on average 50 minutes, with no session taking more than 60 minutes. In total, 75 participants 
took part in the NP-treatment and 75 participants took part in the P-treatment. The experiment 
was conducted in two waves. The first wave was conducted in 2009 (10 sessions) with 51 
subjects in the NP-treatment and 54 subjects in the P-treatment and the second wave was 
conducted in 2011 with 24 subjects in the NP-treatment and 21 subjects in the P-treatment.  
 
2.2 Hypotheses  
                                                          
4 In each treatment, subjects were asked at the end of the game to indicate the intensity of emotions they felt about 
the actual contribution behaviour of each member of their group. The procedure we used to elicit self-reports on 
perceived emotions is due to Bosman and van Winden (2002). In particular, subjects were given a list of thirteen 
emotions, and were then asked to indicate the intensity with which they felt each emotion when they saw the 
contribution of each other group member. The intensity for each emotion was recorded on a 7-point scale (1 = “not 
at all”, …, 7 = “very much”). In order to exclude potential income effects, which may confound the elicitation of 
emotions, elicitation of beliefs was not incentivized. However, since our primary focus is on how priming affects 
pro-social behaviours in a public good game, we have decided not to use data from the emotions’ elicitation in the 
paper. 
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If participants care only about their own earnings, then they should retain all of their own tokens 
and never contribute to the public good. By contrast, in laboratory experiments on cooperation 
issues using a linear public goods game, typically, individuals contribute to the public account to 
some extent. In particular, there is strong empirical evidence that, on average, subjects in one-
shot public goods games contribute approximately 40% of their initial endowment to the public 
good (for a review, see Chaudhuri, 2011). Based on this previous research, we expect 
participants to contribute to some extent to the public good both in the NP-treatment and in the 
P-treatment. However, our main hypothesis is concerned with how individuals respond to our P-
treatment in relation to the NP-treatment. Standard economic theory predicts that priming, which 
is a characteristic of the environment, should have no impact on individuals’ choices. Even 
behavioural theories (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), which can 
explain contributions to the public good, cannot account for any subtle effect inherent in the 
environment in which individuals interact, such as priming. We therefore derive our hypotheses 
by relying on the established literature in psychology. In particular, experimental findings from 
social psychology demonstrate that priming impacts on a wide range of individuals’ attitudes  
such as forming fair-minded social judgments (e.g., viewing the other person as more kind 
compared to a control group), achieving higher performance on an intellectual task and shaping 
reactions to subsequent, unrelated stimuli (for a review see Bargh, 2006). This evidence indicates 
that individuals who have been primed in a positive way show enhanced pro-social behaviours in 
a situation where there is no financial incentive involved and self-report higher levels of 
cooperation compared with individuals who have been neutrally primed. Thus, our main 
hypothesis is that individuals’ contributions will be higher in the P-treatment than in the NP-
treatment. 
 
3. Results 
As mentioned in Section 2.1, we collected data from two waves. Table 1 reports the 
average contribution levels in the NP and in the P treatments as well as the corresponding p-
values using a one-sided Mann-Whitney test. The first wave’s average contributions in the NP-
treatment and the P-treatment were 5 tokens and 6.89 tokens, respectively. The second wave’s 
average contributions in the NP-treatment and the P-treatment were 4.96 tokens and 7.90 tokens, 
respectively. 
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[Insert Table 1 here.] 
 
When we compare whether our samples in the first and the second wave are from 
populations with the same distribution by using a Mann-Whitney test, we find no statistically 
significant differences in contribution levels both in the NP-treatment (one-sided test; p = 0.338) 
and in the P-treatment (one-sided test; p = 0.251). We therefore pool the data from both waves in 
the analysis below. Overall, the average contributions in the NP-treatment are 4.99 tokens, 
whereas in the P-treatment, they are 7.17 tokens. By performing a non-parametric Mann–
Whitney test, we can reject the null hypothesis that contribution levels across treatments are from 
populations with the same distributions at the 5% level (one-sided test; p = 0.044).  
The difference in distributions across treatments is also indicated in Figure 1, which 
shows the kernel distribution of subjects’ contribution levels for each separate treatment. The 
differences between the two treatments are clear. First, there is a larger concentration of full free 
riders in the NP-treatment than in the P-treatment. Second, there is a higher concentration of 
people contributing the maximum amount to the public good in the P-treatment than in the NP-
treatment. Across the two treatments, the kernel density contribution function is flatter for the P-
treatment than for the NP-treatment, which implies that there is a more equal distribution of 
contribution in the former than in the latter treatment. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here.] 
 
To explore formally the effect of cooperative priming on subjects’ contributions, we 
estimated (Table 2) a Tobit regression equation with both left- and right-censoring (the 
contribution level is censored at 0 and 20 tokens) in the dependent variable: 
 (2) 
where 𝐶𝑖 denotes the latent contribution level of subject i in which 
   𝐶𝑖 = � 𝐶𝑖∗  if  𝐶𝐿 < 𝐶𝑖∗ < 𝐶𝑈𝐶𝐿  if  𝐶𝑖∗ ≤ 𝐶𝐿
𝐶𝑈  if  𝐶𝑖∗ ≥ 𝐶𝑈  
where 𝐶𝐿 = 0 and 𝐶𝑈 = 20 (i.e. the minimum and the maximum amount of tokens each subject 
can contribute to the public good); 𝑃𝑖  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
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individual is randomly selected to be in the P-treatment and 0 otherwise; 𝑋𝑖′  is a vector of control 
variables, including a dummy variable representing gender (Females, with Males as the reference 
group), two dummy variables representing nationalities (UK and Other Nationalities, with EU 
students as the reference group) and a dummy variable representing whether the subject takes 
economics as a university degree (Economics, with Non-Economics Degree Subjects as the 
reference group); and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
 
Based on the specification of Table 2, column 1, in which no additional variables were 
included as controls, we can see that subjects in the P-treatment tend to contribute significantly 
more than those in the NP-treatment. Adding the subject’s gender, age, nationality, and 
university major as control variables in column 2’s specification does little to change the result; 
the estimated Tobit coefficient on priming is positive and significant at the 5% level. We also 
find that, on average, female students contribute more compared to male students and that 
nationality matters: students from the UK and other nationalities5 compared with EU students 
tend to contribute significantly less of their endowments to the public good on average. Finally, 
students enrolled on an economics degree do not contribute significantly less than students 
studying for other degrees; the coefficient on the “Economics” variable is negative albeit 
insignificantly different from zero.  
We further investigate whether the positive effect of priming on contribution behaviour 
varies significantly across different personal characteristics. We do this in column 3 of Table 2 
by adding interaction effects between the treatment variable and the other explanatory variables 
(“Female”, “UK”, “Other nationalities”, and “Economics”). The main effect of priming in a fully 
interacted model is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level, thus suggesting that 
contributions are significantly higher in the P-treatment compared to the NP-treatment even 
when we control for subjects’ personal characteristics along with their interaction terms. The 
interaction effects are, however, harder to interpret. This is because they cannot be read off 
directly from the table as conditional marginal effects (see, e.g., Ai and Norton, 2003; 
                                                          
5 The variable “Other nationalities” is equal to 1 for those subjects who reported their nationality as being outside 
the UK and the EU, and 0 otherwise. 
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Drichoutis, 2011). As a result, we use the margins command in STATA 13.0 to calculate the 
differences in the conditional marginal changes in subjects’ contribution levels across different 
personal characteristics (e.g. males versus females, EU versus UK, etc.) and report the estimates 
in the online Appendix D. What we find is that, although the estimated marginal effects of 
priming are more positive for females compared to males, for other nationalities (other than UK) 
compared to EU, for EU compared to UK subjects, and for economics compared to non-
economics subjects, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that these differences are equal to zero 
at conventional levels. In other words, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that the effect of 
priming varies significantly across subjects’ personal characteristics that include gender, 
nationalities, and whether they are studying for a degree in economics.   
Next, we explore whether beliefs about contributions differ between our treatments. 
Figure 2 shows how contributions and beliefs are correlated in each treatment separately, with 
the vertical axis indicating beliefs about others’ contributions and the horizontal axis indicating 
contribution levels. Dots represent combinations of contributions and beliefs per treatment, and 
the size of the dots is proportional to the number of observations that are represented by a dot. 
Dots on the diagonal are contributions that exactly match beliefs. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here.] 
 
We find that the Pearson correlation coefficients are positive and highly statistically 
significant (p < 0.001). Yet, by performing a non-parametric Mann–Whitney test, we can only 
weakly reject the null hypothesis that beliefs about others’ contributions between the NP-
treatment (M = 6.71 tokens) and the P-treatment (M = 7.83 tokens) are from populations with the 
same distribution (one-sided test; p = 0.089). However, recall that we elicited beliefs after 
subjects had made their contribution decisions, and thus, beliefs are endogenous to contributions. 
To test whether priming affects beliefs (as it does with contributions), we estimate a Tobit 
regression model (Table 3) where we include contribution levels as an additional control 
variable. In all columns of Table 3, the dependent variable is beliefs about others’ contributions. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here.] 
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Column 1 shows that, conditioning on individual’s own contribution levels, the estimated 
coefficient on “Priming” is insignificantly different from zero. The effect of priming on beliefs 
about others’ contributions remains statistically insignificant when we control for additional 
explanatory variables such as “Female”, “UK”, “Other nationalities”, and “Economics”, along 
with their interaction terms (see columns 2 and 3 of Table 3).6 
In sum, our main observations from this analysis show that beliefs about others’ 
contributions are positively and significantly correlated with own contribution (in both 
treatments), but beliefs are not significantly different across treatments, ceteris paribus. This 
implies that there are signs that moving beliefs may have been one of the channels through which 
priming affected contributions, but this channel seems to be surprisingly weak and statistically 
insignificant. Yet, it is important to note that our data on subjects’ beliefs about others’ 
contributions were not incentivized and they may not accurately reflect subjects’ true beliefs 
(Gächter and Renner, 2010). We believe that more research is warranted in order to explore 
further the channels through which priming affects behaviour in social dilemma games (see also 
our discussion in Section 4).7 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper investigated the impact of priming cooperation on individuals’ behaviour in a social 
dilemma game. Motivated by previous findings on priming in psychology, we investigated 
whether people can be primed to contribute more of their endowment towards a common 
resource in a situation where there is a clear financial incentive to free ride. We found that 
priming cooperation can lead to higher contributions to the public good and that contributions of 
the primed group are approximately 11 percentage points higher than those of the non-primed 
group. Although the economic effects (measured by average earnings) of our priming technique 
                                                          
6The differences in the conditional marginal effects of priming on beliefs about other people’s contributions are also 
statistically insignificant across different personal characteristics; see online Appendix D. 
7 In a post-experimental questionnaire we asked subjects the following question: “Do you think the first experiment 
has affected your decisions in the second experiment?”. This would allow us to control for potential experimenter 
demand effects that might emerge from the use of our priming intervention. None of the subjects in the non-priming 
treatment and 16 out of 75 subjects in the priming treatment answered this question positively. When we include a 
dummy variable controlling for those who reported that the priming task affected their subsequent behavior, the 
estimated coefficient on the variable “Priming” remains statistically significant for the regressions of contributions 
(Models 1, 2 and 3) and statistically insignificant for the regressions of beliefs about others’ contributions (Models 
4, 5 and 6). Notice that the coefficient of the variable (“Understanding the experiment”) capturing whether subjects’ 
behavior had been affected by our priming task is insignificant in all our econometric models. We report our 
regression models in Appendix E. 
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are not overwhelmingly large (due partly to the nature of public good games where individual’s 
earnings is a function on other people’s contributions as well as individual’s own contributions), 
our finding that priming affects measures of social preferences such as cooperative behaviour in 
a one-shot public good game should be of interest to economists and indicates that they should 
investigate its effects further to gain a better understanding of it. Our results also suggest that 
priming does not affect subjects’ beliefs about other group members’ contributions, ceteris 
paribus, indicating that priming primarily seems to work by changing subjects’ preferences 
about how much to contribute. Nevertheless, despite not finding heterogeneous effects across 
groups of subjects based on their observable characteristics, an interesting extension would be to 
elicit subjects’ types (using the strategy method by Fischbacher et al., 2001) and to explore 
whether different types of people (e.g. selfish, (un)conditional cooperative, confused, others) 
respond differently to priming. 
We have focused only on a one-shot public goods game, so we can say nothing about the 
long-term impacts of priming on decisions that people will need to make repeatedly over time. 
Moreover, we are not able to address the issue of whether priming may affect economically 
relevant behaviours other than those observed in the public goods game. Another caveat is that 
only one method of priming – i.e. words and associations – was used in our experiment. Future 
research should revert to this issue and explore whether different methods of priming produce 
different rates of success in influencing people’s economic decisions. For example, the effects of 
negative priming have been poorly understood in the literature, and further research is necessary 
to identify how negative priming interacts with cooperative behaviour. This would provide us 
with an answer to the question of what drives the effects of priming: is it the presence of priming 
or the type of priming adopted (positive vs. negative)? 
More generally, we believe that priming warrants further systematic investigations by 
economists, particularly with respect to its temporal sustainability and effectiveness both in 
terms of contribution behaviour but also in terms of average welfare (in the short run and as well 
as in the long run). Future research may also need to return to estimate where the optimal range 
of priming-intensity lies by varying the ratio of cooperative words to neutral words in the word 
search puzzle. These future research possibilities will allow a greater understanding of how 
priming may impact on economic behaviours in general. 
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Table 1: Average contributions in the NP-treatment and P-treatment 
 Pooled Wave 1 Wave 2 
  NP P NP P NP P 
Mean 4.99 7.17 5.00 6.89 4.96 7.91 
Standard 
deviation [5.32] [6.77] [5.52] [6.85] [5.00] [6.67] 
       
p-value 0.044 0.125 0.069 
Note: The p-values reported above correspond to a one-sided Mann-Whitney test. 
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Figure 1: Kernel distribution of contributions 
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Table 2: Tobit regressions on contributions 
 VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3) 
     
Primed 3.421* 3.726** 8.246* 
 [1.744] [1.723] [4.448] 
Female  4.269** 3.318 
  [1.735] [2.164] 
UK  -4.890** -1.431 
  [2.176] [2.719] 
Other nationalities  -4.359* -2.741 
  [2.271] [3.161] 
Economics  -1.023 -0.557 
  [1.882] [2.383] 
Primed × Female   1.091 
   [3.409] 
Primed × UK   -7.573* 
   [4.315] 
Primed × Other nationalities   -3.865 
   [4.537] 
Primed × Economics   -0.259 
   [3.818] 
Constant 2.306*** 3.927* 2.101 
 [1.205] [2.323] [2.795] 
Observations 150 150 150 
Note: *<10%; **<5%, ***<1%. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. The dependent variable is 
contributions and is censored both from below at 0 tokens and from above at 20 tokens.  
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Figure 2: Correlation between contributions and beliefs about others’ contributions 
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Table 3: Tobit regressions on beliefs about others’ contributions 
 VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3) 
     
Primed 0.007 -0.160 -2.080 
 [0.699] [0.732] [2.367] 
Contribution 0.562*** 0.571*** 0.577*** 
 [0.075] [0.073] [0.069] 
Female  -0.373 -1.429 
  [0.733] [0.927] 
UK  0.187 -0.108 
  [1.076] [1.166] 
Other nationalities  1.283 2.033 
  [1.209] [1.413] 
Economics  0.057 -0.758 
  [0.784] [1.104] 
Primed × Female   2.254* 
   [1.368] 
Primed × UK   0.910 
   [2.289] 
Primed × Other nationalities   -1.085 
   [2.496] 
Primed × Economics   1.693 
   [1.590] 
Constant 3.567*** 3.281*** 4.083*** 
 [0.693] [1.146] [1.353] 
Observations 150 150 150 
Note: *<10%; **<5%, ***<1%. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. The dependent variable is beliefs 
about others’ contributions and is censored both from below at 0 tokens and from above at 20 tokens.  
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Online Appendix 
Appendix A – List of primes 
Assist 5.679 Smart 3.321 Participation 5.75 
Obligate 3.25 Unkind 1.679 Responsibility 5.643 
Generous 3.714 Sociable 4.321 Harmony 5.5 
Society 4.964 Loving 3.786 Mutual 5.643 
Community 5.286 Family 4.571 Kind hearted 3.857 
Helpless 2.357 Collective 5.214 Public 4.179 
Trust 5.25 United 5.679 Stingy 2.143 
Friendship 4.786 Cheerful 3.321 Equality 4.643 
Closeness 4.107 Liberal 3.429 Risk 3.25 
Moral 3.786 Reciprocal 4.857 Aid 4.679 
Tight 3.179 Unfair 1.929   
Support 5.5 Honest 4.786   
Sharing 5.679 Kindness 4.321   
Selfless 4.071 Malicious 1.786   
Skilful 3.464 Considerate 4.714   
Collaborate 6.143 Goodness 4.357   
Altruistic 4.286 Contribution 5.571   
Careless 2 Donation 3.75   
Charity 3.857 Teamwork 6.5   
Giving 4. 429 Noble 3.429   
Note: This table presents the complete list of primes along with the corresponding average scores. 
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Appendix B – Word search puzzles 
 
Matrix for the NP-treatment 
 
 
Solution matrix for the NP-treatment 
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Matrix for the P-treatment 
 
Solution matrix for the P-treatment 
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Appendix C – Experimental instructions 
 
[Note: The instructions used in this experiment are presented below. The instructions in the NP-
treatment differ from those in the P-treatment only with regards to the first experiment, in which 
subjects need to solve a word search puzzle. The instructions for the second experiment are 
identical between treatments.] 
 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
Welcome to this session, and thank you for participating. From now onwards please do not talk 
to any other participants until the session is finished. 
 
During this session, you will take part in two experiments. You will now undertake the first 
experiment. You will learn about the second experiment at the beginning of that experiment, 
where you will receive new instructions. 
 
FIRST EXPERIMENT 
 
For the first experiment, you need to find the words embedded in the letter matrix according to 
the list presented below. The letter matrix is attached in the next page. Words can appear with 
letters in a straight line either from left to right or from right to left reading down or reading up, 
and diagonally reading either down or up. The words you need to identify are as follows: 
 
 
 
BUTTERFLY  TURTLE  UMBRELLA  SHAMPOO 
       
SALAD  CORKSCREW  LAMP  ILLUSTRATE 
       
WINDOW  HAT  CARPET  BUILDING 
       
GASOLINE PLANT  RIVER  RANCH 
       
MOUNTAIN  CABBAGE  STAPLER  PEACH 
 
 
 
You will have ten minutes to solve this word-search puzzle. Your performance in this 
experiment will not affect at all your payment at the end of the session. At the end of this 
experiment you will receive a matrix indicating the answers for the word-search puzzle. 
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GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
Welcome to this session, and thank you for participating. From now onwards please do not talk 
to any other participants until the session is finished. 
 
During this session, you will take part in two experiments. You will now undertake the first 
experiment. You will learn about the second experiment at the beginning of that experiment, 
where you will receive new instructions. 
 
FIRST EXPERIMENT 
 
For the first experiment, you need to find the words embedded in the letter matrix according to 
the list presented below. The letter matrix is attached in the next page. Words can appear with 
letters in a straight line either from left to right or from right to left reading down or reading up, 
and diagonally reading either down or up. The words you need to identify are as follows: 
 
 
 
TEAMWORK  ASSIST  RESPONSIBILITY  SHAMPOO 
       
PARTICIPATE  COMMUNITY  LAMP  COLLABORATE 
       
WINDOW  MUTUAL  CARPET  UNITED 
       
SHARE  PLANT  COLLECTIVE  SOCIETY 
       
TRUST  HARMONY  CONTRIBUTE  SUPPORT 
 
 
 
You will have ten minutes to solve this word-search puzzle. Your performance in this 
experiment will not affect at all your payment at the end of the session. At the end of this 
experiment you will receive a matrix indicating the answers for the word-search puzzle. 
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SECOND EXPERIMENT 
 
You will now undertake the second experiment. If you read the following instructions carefully, 
you can, depending on the decisions that you and other participants make, earn a considerable 
amount of money. It is therefore very important that you read these instructions with care. 
 
These instructions are solely for your private use. If you have any questions, please ask us. 
 
During this experiment we will not speak in terms of Pounds, but in Guilders. During this 
experiment your entire earnings will be calculated in Guilders. At the end of the experiment the 
total amount of Guilders you have earned will be converted to Pounds at the following rate: 
1 Guilder = 0.40 Pounds  
 
At the end of the experiment your entire earnings from the experiment will be paid to you in 
cash. 
 
At the beginning of this experiment, all participants will be randomly divided into groups of 
three. Apart from you, there will be two more members in your group. You will not learn who 
the other people in your group are at any point. 
 
In the following pages we describe the experiment in detail. At the end of this introductory 
information we ask you to do several control exercises which are designed to check that you 
have understood the decision situation. 
 
Detailed information on the experiment 
 
Each participant receives an endowment of 20 tokens. You have to decide how many of these 20 
tokens you contribute to a group project and how many you keep for yourself. The two other 
members of your group have to make the same decision. They can also either contribute tokens 
to the project or keep tokens for themselves. You and the other members of the group can each 
choose any amount between 0 and 20 tokens to contribute. 
 
Every token that you do not contribute to the project automatically belongs to you and earns you 
one Guilder. For the tokens contributed to the project the following happens: the project’s value 
will be multiplied by 1.5 and this amount will be divided equally among all three members of the 
group. For example, if 1 token is contributed to the project, the project’s value increases to 1.5 
Guilders. This amount is divided equally among all three members of the group. Thus every 
group member receives 0.5 Guilders. 
 
Your income from the project rises by 0.5 Guilders if you contribute one token more to the 
project. At the same time, the income of the other two members of the group also rises by 0.5 
tokens, because they receive the same income from the project as you do. Therefore, if you 
contribute one token more to the project, the income from the project received by the whole 
group together increases by 1.5 Guilders. It is also true that your income rises by 0.5 Guilders if 
another group member contributes one token more to the project. After all three members of the 
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group have made their decisions about the amounts of tokens they contribute to the project the 
total income achieved by each participant is determined. 
 
How is your income calculated from your decision? 
 
The income of every member of the group is calculated in the same way. As you can see, your 
income consists of two parts: 
 
(1) The tokens which you have kept for yourself (‘income from tokens kept’) whereby 1 token = 
1 Guilder. 
(2) The ‘income from the project’ calculated as follows: Your income from the project = 0.5 
times sum of all tokens contributed to the project by members of your group. 
 
Your total income in Guilders at the experiment is therefore: 
 
(20 – tokens contributed to the project by you) + 0.5*(sum of all tokens contributed to the 
project by members of your group) 
 
If you do not contribute anything to the project the income from tokens kept is 20. If you 
contribute for instance 7 tokens to the project your income from tokens kept is 13. At the same 
time, the total sum of tokens contributed to the project increases and so does your ‘income from 
the project’. 
 
In order to explain the income calculation we give some examples. Please read them 
carefully: 
 
Example 1: 
If each of the three members of the group contributes 0 tokens to the project, all three will 
receive an ‘income from tokens kept’ of 20. Nobody receives anything from the project, because 
no one contributed anything. Therefore the total income of every member of the group is 20 
tokens. 
Calculation of the total income of every participant: (20-0) + 0.5 * (0) = 20 
 
Example 2: 
If each of the three members of the group contributes 20 tokens, there will be a total of 60 tokens 
contributed to the project. The ‘income from tokens kept’ is 0 for everyone, but each member 
receives an income from the project of 0.5 * 60 = 30 tokens. 
Calculation of the total income of every participant: (20-20) + 0.5 * (60) = 30 
 
Example 3: 
If you contribute 20 tokens, the second member 10 tokens and the third 0 tokens, the following 
incomes are calculated.  
- Because you and the second member of the group have together contributed 30 tokens, 
everyone will receive 0.5 * 30 = 15 Guilders from the project.  
- You contributed all your 20 tokens to the project. You will therefore receive 15 Guilders 
in total at the end of the experiment.  
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- The second member of the group also receives 15 Guilders from the project. In addition, 
he receives 10 Guilders as the ‘income from tokens kept’, because he contributed 10 
tokens to the project. Thus, he receives 15 + 10 = 25 Guilders altogether. 
- The third member of the group, who did not contribute anything, also receives the 15 
Guilders from the project and additionally the 20 Guilders from the ‘income from tokens 
kept’, which means 20 + 15 = 35. 
Calculation of your total income: (20-20) + 0.5 * (30) = 15 
Calculation of the total income of the 2nd group member: (20-10) + 0.5 * (30) = 25 
Calculation of the total income of the 3rd group member: (20-0) + 0.5 * (30) = 35 
 
Example 4: 
The two other members of your group contribute 20 tokens each to the project. You do not 
contribute anything. In this case the income will be calculated as follows: 
Calculation of your total income: (20-0) + 0.5 * (40) = 40 
Calculation of the total income of the 2nd group member: (20-20) + 0.5 * (40) = 20 
Calculation of the total income of the 3rd group member: (20-20) + 0.5 * (40) = 20 
 
When making your decision, the following input-screen will appear: 
 
 
 
As mentioned above, your endowment in this experiment is 20 tokens. You have to decide how 
many tokens you contribute to the project by typing a number between 0 and 20 in the input 
field. This field can be reached by clicking it with the mouse. By deciding how many tokens to 
contribute to the project, you automatically decide how many tokens you keep for yourself. After 
entering the amount of tokens you contribute you must press the O.K. button using the mouse. 
Once you have done this, your decision can no longer be revised. 
 
After all participants have made their decisions, your total income will be displayed on the 
following screen: 
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Do you have any questions? 
 
Control Questionnaire 
 
1. Each group member has an endowment of 20 tokens. Suppose that nobody (including 
yourself) contributes any token to the project. 
 What is your income ?........... 
 What is the income of the other group members?........... 
 
2. Each group member has an endowment of 20 tokens. Suppose that you contribute 20 tokens 
to the project. All other group members each contribute 20 tokens to the project.  
 What is your income?........... 
 What is the income of the other group members?........... 
 
3. Each group member has an endowment of 20 tokens. Suppose that the other two group 
members contribute together a total of  30 tokens to the project. 
 What is your income if you contribute 0 tokens to the project?........... 
 What is your income if you contribute 4 tokens to the project?........... 
 
4. Each group member has an endowment of 20 tokens. Suppose that you contribute 8 tokens to 
the project. 
What is your income if the other group members together contribute a total of 14 tokens to 
the project?........... 
What is your income if the other group members together contribute a total of 22 tokens to 
the project?........... 
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Appendix D – Estimated differences in the conditional marginal effects of priming across 
different personal characteristics 
 
Differences in the estimated marginal effects Contributions Beliefs 
Males versus Females 1.826 1.811 
 
[3.378] [1.361] 
EU versus UK -5.161 1.273 
 
[3.313] [1.455] 
EU versus Other nationalities 2.098 -1.615 
 
[3.433] [1.603] 
Non-economics versus Economics 0.047 1.511 
 
[3.765] [1.563] 
Note: The estimates are obtained using the margins command in STATA 13.0. and are based on Tables 2 and 3’s 
column 3’s specification. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Appendix E – Tobit regressions on contributions and beliefs about others’ contributions, 
controlling for understanding the nature of the experiment  
 
 Contributions Beliefs about others’ contributions 
 VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Primed 3.327* 3.774** 8.268* -0.295 -0.563 -2.368 
 [1.826] [1.798] [4.383] [0.719] [0.771] [2.427] 
Contribution    0.561*** 0.571*** 0.576*** 
    [0.074] [0.072] [0.068] 
Female  4.280** 3.318  -0.469 -1.428 
  [1.763] [2.164]  [0.743] [0.926] 
UK  -4.891** -1.431  0.191 -0.107 
  [2.175] [2.719]  [1.073] [1.165] 
Other nationalities  -4.381* -2.741  1.454 2.032 
  [2.267] [3.161]  [1.221] [1.412] 
Economics  -1.021 -0.557  0.029 -0.756 
  [1.883] [2.383]  [0.772] [1.102] 
Primed × Female   1.101   2.094 
   [3.481]   [1.390] 
Primed × UK   -7.573*   0.892 
   [4.314]   [2.281] 
Primed × Other 
nationalities 
  
-3.883 
  
-0.844 
   [4.526]   [2.523] 
Primed × Economics   -0.257   1.640 
   [3.824]   [1.569] 
Understanding the 
experiment 0.448 -0.213 -0.102 1.438 1.790 1.457 
 [3.508] [3.475] [3.594] [1.468] [1.505] [1.471] 
Constant 2.306* 3.926* 2.101 3.574*** 3.299*** 4.084*** 
 [1.205] [2.323] [2.795] [0.690] [1.149] [1.351] 
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 150 
Note: *<10%; **<5%, ***<1%. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. In Models 1, 2 and 3, the dependent 
variable is contributions and is censored both from below at 0 tokens and from above at 20 tokens. In Models 4, 5 
and 6, the dependent variable is beliefs about others’ contributions and is censored both from below at 0 tokens and 
from above at 20 tokens. 
 
 
 
 
 
